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Abstract 
 
We analyze the potential impact of continuing the existing U.S. sugar program, replacing it with 
a standard program, and implementing the standard program with multilateral trade 
liberalization. Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), duty-free sugar 
imports from Mexico will undermine the program’s ability to operate on a “no-cost” basis to 
U.S. taxpayers. As the Mexican beverage industry is likely to expand considerably its high-
fructose corn syrup use, the sugar thereby displaced will seek a market in the United States. 
Under these conditions, marketing allotments could not be utilized under current legislation and 
prices would likely fall to the loan rate. The government would accumulate significant sugar 
stocks. The replacement of the current sugar program by one similar to other major U.S. crop 
programs would solve the problem of stock accumulation and accommodate further trade 
liberalization under a new World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement or future bilateral trade 
agreements. Our analysis of recent WTO proposals suggests that a WTO agreement is unlikely to 
impose significant adjustment pressures on the U.S. sugar market beyond those created by 
NAFTA. The adoption of a standard program would make it easier for the United States to meet 
its commitments under a new WTO agreement in terms of reductions in trade-distorting amber-
box support. Moving to a standard program would increase the costs of the program for 
taxpayers but would lower costs for sugar users. Given reasonable assumptions about program 
parameters, the principal program cost would likely be through direct payments rather than 
through countercyclical or loan-deficiency payments. These costs could be lower than the 
maximum estimated here, because of limitations on payments to individual producers. 
 
Keywords:  Doha, NAFTA, policy, sugar, U.S. sugar program. 
 
 Introduction 
Sugar figured early in the history of the United States. One of the first acts of the newly created 
Congress in 1789 was to impose a tariff on imported sugar in order to raise revenue for the new 
republic. In 1842 the tariff structure was modified to provide protection to the domestic sugar 
refining industry and to promote the domestic production of sugar. A federal price support 
program for sugar, the Jones-Costigan Act, was enacted in 1934. With the exception of two brief 
periods during the 1970s and early 1980s, the United States has continued to operate a price 
support program for sugar (see Box 1 for a brief history). The current sugar program, introduced 
under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, uses import controls and marketing 
allotments and allows for certain other measures (payment-in-kind provisions) to try to ensure 
that the government does not accumulate stocks at the price support (loan rate). The current 
program is supposed to operate at no net cost to the U.S. taxpayer. 
 Considerable uncertainty exists about the long-run viability of the U.S. sugar program, 
not least because of the commitment by the United States under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) to allow duty-free imports of sugar from Mexico beginning in 2008. 
Combined with a commitment under the Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to maintain a minimum level of imports from other suppliers, the 
NAFTA provisions seem likely to lead to increased sugar imports with resulting downward 
pressure on U.S. sugar prices. If the effect is sufficiently large, it might be impossible to continue 
to operate a program of the existing type on a “no-cost” basis. There is also the possibility that 
imports might increase as a result of other preferential or free-trade agreements that may be 
adopted by the United States, or through the eventual conclusion of the Doha Round of 
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international trade negotiations and disputes resolution currently underway at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (see WTO 2004, 2006a, 2006b, and 2006c, and Box 2). The 2007 farm bill 
debate coincides with the WTO negotiations of the Doha Round. The multilateral trade policy 
outcome will put bounds on allowable domestic support and trade protection of the U.S. sugar 
industry. This dual policy debate provides an opportunity to revisit policy options for the sugar 
program. We assess the potential implications of changing sugar trade policy and the domestic 
sugar program. We look at the consequences of increased levels of imports for a future U.S. 
government program for sugar. We begin by examining the potential impact on the current 
program of an increase in sugar imports from Mexico under the NAFTA agreement. We contrast 
that impact with the situation in which the current sugar program is replaced by a price and 
income support program of the type currently used for other major crops in the United States. 
Finally, we evaluate the effect of potential new international trade commitments resulting from a 
Doha WTO agreement. 
The Analysis Conducted 
We evaluate three policy scenarios for sugar: (i) the continuation of the existing U.S. sugar 
program currently in operation under the 2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act—which 
we refer to as the baseline scenario; (ii) replacement of the current U.S. sugar policy by a 
program equivalent to that used for other major crops (wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice, 
and oilseeds) but in the absence of any changes in trade policies in the United States or other 
countries, beyond those already agreed upon—we term this the standard program scenario; and 
(iii) the replacement of the current policy by a standard program but with further multilateral 
liberalization of international trade (in particular, an increase in the sugar tariff rate quota [TRQ] 
and reduction in over-quota tariffs) under the assumption that a new agreement on agriculture is 
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concluded as a result of the current round of negotiations in the WTO—we term this the trade 
liberalization scenario. 
 Our analysis of these scenarios is based on a multi-market model embedding a detailed 
model of U.S. crops into a model of the international sugar market. These combined models 
generate key variables, such as equilibrium prices and quantities, trade flows, and local 
equilibrium in each country consuming and/or producing sugar. The combined model provides a 
10-year trajectory for the sugar market in the United States and other key countries given 
assumptions about macroeconomic and policy variables. The model captures the interaction 
between the corn and sugar sub-sectors through high-fructose corn sweetener (HFCS). The 
international sugar market model reflects trade and domestic policies for sugar in key importing 
and exporting countries and permits us to capture the effects of changes in these policies on 
international trade volumes and prices, as well as any feedback effects on the U.S. sugar market. 
The analysis is conducted for the period 2004/05–2014/15 (federal fiscal years 2005–2015). The 
principal tables in our report summarize the results using averages for 2008–2015. 
 We find that duty-free sugar imports from Mexico will undermine the program’s ability 
to operate on a “no-cost” basis to U.S. taxpayers. As the Mexican beverage industry will expand 
considerably its HFCS use, the sugar thereby displaced will seek a market in the United States. 
Under these conditions, marketing allotments could not be utilized under current legislation and 
prices would likely fall to the loan rate. The government would accumulate significant sugar 
stocks. The replacement of the current sugar program by one similar to other major U.S. crop 
programs would solve the problem of stock accumulation and accommodate further trade 
liberalization under a new WTO agreement or future bilateral trade agreements. An analysis of 
recent WTO proposals suggests that a WTO agreement is unlikely to impose significant 
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adjustment pressures on the U.S. sugar market beyond those created by NAFTA. The adoption of 
a standard program would make it easier for the United States to meet its commitments under a 
new WTO agreement in terms of reductions in trade-distorting amber-box support. The move to 
a standard program would increase the costs of the program for taxpayers but would lower costs 
for sugar users. Given reasonable assumptions about program parameters, the principal program 
cost would likely be through direct payments rather than through countercyclical or loan-
deficiency payments. These costs could be lower than the maximum estimated here, because of 
limitations on payments to individual producers. 
 Many assumptions are required in order to project the future evolution of the U.S. sugar 
market. We have drawn upon expert knowledge in the business and academic communities to 
create a plausible set of assumptions as to how markets might evolve. Alternative assumptions 
are possible, and year-to-year variation in weather and other conditions could result in outcomes 
that are significantly different from those presented here, as dramatically illustrated by the 2005 
hurricane season. As we have not assigned probabilities to the values that we present or indicated 
the range of potential variation, our results should be interpreted as projections of plausible 
futures for the sugar market rather than forecasts. 
 In what follows, we focus first on the modeling framework underlying the study. Then, in 
sequence, we describe the key assumptions underlying each scenario and associated results. 
Conclusions highlight policy implications. Three appendixes provide additional information for 
the avid reader. The detailed assumptions underlying each scenario are contained in Appendix A. 
Appendix B presents implications of payment limitations on payments and program cost. 
Appendix C summarizes further sensitivity analysis results. 
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2. Modeling Approach  
 The analysis is based on a multimarket model of the U.S. crop sector linked to a modified 
version of the international sugar model maintained at the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. The modification centers on the substitution of 
the detailed U.S. crop sector model for the simpler U.S. sugar component of the original CARD 
international model. The U.S. component of the model is a large U.S. crop model that explains 
land allocation decisions among major crops on a regional basis and depends on relative net 
returns and policy program incentives. The return computation incorporates all major U.S. policy 
instruments such as direct payments, countercyclical payments (CCPs), loan deficiency 
payments (LDPs), trade policy, and provisions of the sugar programs such as production 
allotments, the TRQ scheme for Mexico, and the aggregate TRQ scheme for other countries. The 
U.S. model provides estimates of sugar and HFCS use, beginning and ending inventories, and 
government program costs for each of its components (Westhoff).  
 The CARD international sugar model is a non-spatial, partial-equilibrium econometric 
world sugar model consisting of 29 countries/regions, including a Rest-of-the-World aggregate 
to close the model. All major sugar producing, exporting, and importing countries are included. 
The model specifies only raw sugar production, use, and trade between countries/regions and 
does not disaggregate refined trade from raw trade. Consequently, there is no category for 
importers as refiners or toll refiners because the countries that specialize in that role are well 
known and stable over time. Country coverage includes Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech and Slovak 
Republics), Egypt, European Union-15, Former Soviet Union (FSU) (mainly Russia and the 
Ukraine), India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
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South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, United States, Venezuela, and a Rest-of-World 
aggregate.  
 The general structure of any country sub-model includes behavioral equations for area 
harvested, yield, production for sugar beet and sugarcane on the supply side, and per capita 
consumption, other uses, and ending stocks on the demand side. The Mexican sub-model further 
includes HFCS production, trade and use, and HFCS policy distortions. In each sub-model 
equilibrium prices, quantities, and net trade are determined by equating excess supply and excess 
demand across countries and regions. Using price transmission equations, the domestic price of 
each country or region is linked to a representative world price (Caribbean FOB price) through 
exchange rates and other price policy parameters such as tariffs and transfer-service margins. 
The model includes cross-price effects in supply of several crops. The model structure can be 
modified on demand for specific investigations (Beghin et al.). The model accommodates 
analyses of trade and domestic policy reform scenarios. Trade policies for most countries, as well 
as domestic policies in several key OECD countries, are parameterized in the model (see Elobeid 
and Beghin). More information on the international CARD sugar model is available online, 
including key parameter values (FAPRI). 
 Data for area, yield, sugarcane, and sugar beet production, sugar production, 
consumption, and ending stocks were obtained from PS&D View of the United States 
Department of Agriculture. Cane and beet production is tied to sugar production through 
extraction rates. Macroeconomic data such as real gross domestic product, consumer price index, 
population, and exchange rate were gathered from various sources, including the International 
Monetary Fund and Global Insight (see Appendix A for the baseline macro data).  
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3. Baseline Scenario Results 
In the baseline scenario (continuation of the existing sugar program), we assume that the current 
U.S. sugar program continues to operate through 2015.1 The cane sugar loan rate is maintained at 
18¢ per pound (raw value) and the beet sugar loan rate is at 22.9¢ per pound (refined value). 
Sugar yields and consumption trends are assumed to develop in line with recent trends. Beet 
yields are projected to rise from roughly 22 tons per acre in fiscal year 2006 to just over 23 tons 
in fiscal year 2015 and sugar recovery rates are projected at just under 16 percent and closing at 
17 percent. Cane yields over the same period are projected to increase from around 35 tons to 
over 37 tons per acre, with a slight increase in the recovery rate (from 12.4 to 12.7 percent). 
Total U.S. sugar and sweetener consumption does not change significantly because of 
insensitivity to changes in prices and consumer incomes, implying a modest decline in per capita 
consumption. 
 In preparing the baseline, we address the likely future trading relationship in sugar and 
HFCS between the United States and Mexico (see Box 2 for more information). We assume that 
the current dispute over HFCS will be resolved and that the Mexican tax on soda beverages 
containing HFCS will be eliminated in 2007/08. This is consistent with a recent WTO ruling and 
Appellate Report (WTO, 2006b and 2006c). Eventually Mexico will have to remove the tax. 
From 2007/08 onward, Mexico has duty-free access to the U.S. market for its sugar. The United 
States has duty-free access to the Mexican market for HFCS, but Mexico’s own production of 
HFCS can also be expected to expand. The resolution of the dispute over HFCS could have a 
significant impact on its use in the Mexican beverage industry, on Mexico’s production of 
HFCS, and on its imports of the product from the United States. The displacement of sugar by 
                                                 
1 The marketing year used in the study is October through September unless otherwise indicated. 
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HFCS in Mexican beverage production would likely lead to increased sugar shipments to the 
United States.  
 To examine the potential implications of different dispute outcomes, we use two variants 
of our baseline scenario. First, we assume limited displacement of sugar in Mexican beverage 
production, with a consequent modest increase in shipments of Mexican sugar to the United 
States. Under this assumption, annual duty-free imports of sugar by the United States from 
NAFTA partners average 218,000 short tons (raw basis) for 2008-2015.2 We refer to this 
scenario as the Low Import Baseline. Alternatively, we assume substantial displacement of sugar 
by domestically produced and imported HFCS in Mexican beverage production with a resulting 
significant expansion in U.S. imports of sugar from Mexico. Under this assumption, U.S. duty-
free imports from NAFTA partners average 1.36 million tons per year over the period. We refer 
to this scenario as the High Import Baseline. 
 The two variants have significantly different implications for the U.S. sugar market. The 
first two columns of Tables 1-5 contain the average values of relevant variables for 2008-2015 
for these two scenarios. Column 5 shows the comparative change in each variable (high import 
value minus low import value). With modest imports from Mexico, the New York (NY) spot 
price for raw sugar averages over 20¢ per pound (Table 1). Domestic production is largely 
constrained by marketing allotments and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stocks are 
modest. With high imports from Mexico, the raw sugar price declines to less than 19¢ per pound. 
U.S. sugar production declines by 3.5 percent on average in response to the lower prices, but 
CCC stocks increase to an average of over 1 million tons (Table 1). The adjustments in 
                                                 
2 We assume that there are no significant changes in imports of sugar-containing products from Canada in the 
baseline. We do not consider the possibility that imports of sugar into Mexico from Central American suppliers 
could also lead to the displacement of Mexican sugar to the U.S. market. Changes in either of these factors could put 
further downward pressure on U.S. sugar prices. 
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production on a state-by-state basis are given in Table 2 for beets and in Table 3 for cane. In line 
with the conditions of the current sugar program, marketing allotments are suspended and the 
result is a buildup of government stocks. The magnitude of the price decline is limited by an 
assumption that the secretary of agriculture would use a payment-in-kind (PIK) program to limit 
market oversupply. 
 As a result, government program costs for sugar rise from an average of $8 million per 
year under the low import scenario to $175 million under the high import scenario. Lower sugar 
prices result in a modest displacement of HFCS and this leads to slightly higher CCPs for corn. 
With those expenditures included, total government program costs increase to an average of 
$187 million per year. 
 A significant increase in sugar imports from Mexico associated with duty-free access 
under NAFTA would make it unlikely that the existing U.S. sugar program could continue to be 
operated on a “no-cost” basis, when the increase in imports is combined with a major 
displacement of sugar by HFCS in the Mexican beverage industry. In deriving our results we 
have assumed that the secretary of agriculture exercises the option of operating a PIK program in 
order to control the buildup of government stocks, but this displaces the problem rather than 
solving it. It seems unlikely that such a program could be sustained at a high level over the long 
term because of the uneven effects of a program on the beet and cane components of the industry 
and such a program’s costs. Cane net returns fall much more than their counterparts in beet 
production (see Tables 2 and 3). Sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix C does not affect this 
conclusion on the unsustainable nature of the sugar program in its current form. A new farm bill 
could redefine the allotment formula based on much larger imports, therefore leading to much 
smaller allowable production, an unpalatable outcome as well.  
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4. Standard Commodity Program Scenario Results 
In this standard program scenario we assume that the current sugar program is replaced by one in 
which the loan rates for beet and cane sugar are reduced, producers are paid a fixed direct 
payment per ton based on fixed areas and yields, and a single target price is established that is 
used to determine CCPs if prices fall below the target price. Other aspects of sugar policy, in 
particular the level of the TRQ and sugar tariffs, are unchanged under this standard-commodity-
program scenario. The choice of program parameters was based on extensive discussions with a 
number of sugar industry experts. The parameters are shown in Table 6 and should be seen as a 
set of “reasonable” working assumptions about the characteristics of the alternative program.3 
 Again, we examine two cases that correspond to our cases of the baseline scenarios. 
Column 3 of Tables 1-5 gives the values derived under the assumption of low sugar imports from 
Mexico; column 4 contains the values under the high import assumption. Columns 6 and 7 of the 
tables contain the differences in values when each of the two scenarios is compared to its 
corresponding baseline. 
 There are several important features to note. First, the NY spot price of sugar falls by 
roughly 10 percent from each of the respective baseline prices. Under the high Mexican imports 
scenario, the spot price averages less than 17¢ per pound (Table 1). Second, U.S. sugar 
production is higher with the standard program in operation, even under the assumption of a 
substantial increase in the sugar coming from Mexico (Table 1). There are no marketing 
allotments (or PIK) to constrain domestic production, and many producers find it profitable to 
produce at prices that are still relatively high in comparison to those that prevail on international 
markets. Third, sugar consumption (domestic deliveries) increases by roughly 350,000 to 
                                                 
3 These policy values were decided before hurricanes destroyed a significant share of the 2005 sugarcane crop. They 
represent a consensus view of “realistic” values. 
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400,000 tons compared to the equivalent baseline results. Slightly higher consumption is 
stimulated by the reduction in sugar prices, and there is some substitution for HFCS; the 
domestic use of HFCS falls by roughly 230,000 to 250,000 tons. Despite this, the reduction in 
HFCS use and prices has only a small effect on corn prices, as corn use in HFCS is a small 
fraction of total U.S. corn use. Finally, the U.S. government does not accumulate stocks because 
prices remain above the now lower loan rates (Table 1). However, the total cost of the sugar 
program rises, primarily because of expenditures on direct payments, which average $463 
million per year.4 Because we assume that imports of sugar would rise sharply after 2007/08 in 
the high import scenario, some CCPs and LDPs are triggered by lower prices in the early years, 
but U.S. sugar prices then recover to find a new equilibrium just above the loan rate. Averaged 
over the entire period, these payments amount to roughly $60 million per year. There is also an 
increase in corn CCPs due to the impact of lower sugar prices on corn prices. Under the high 
import scenario, the standard program increases corn CCP expenditures by an average of $17 
million per year. 
5. Impact of a Doha Round WTO Trade Agreement 
 In the trade liberalization scenario, we examine the potential implications for U.S. sugar 
of a new agreement under the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations. These negotiations 
were launched in November 2001. It has proved difficult to finalize the agricultural provisions of 
an agreement. The then chairman of the WTO agriculture committee, Stuart Harbinson, prepared 
some fairly detailed draft modalities for agriculture in March 2003 (WTO, 2003), but these 
proposals were not accepted. A less-detailed framework for the modalities was agreed upon in 
                                                 
4 These numbers do not reflect payment limitations, which could reduce the cost of the program from that reported 
here. It is difficult to determine the extent to which payments would be reduced. Appendix B presents some 
estimates based on the assumption that payment limitations would be binding. Under this assumption, expenditures 
on direct payments would fall from $463 million to $224 million per year. Actual expenditures would likely be 
somewhere between these two values. 
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Geneva on August 1, 2004 (WTO, 2004). Since then, several proposals have been made by 
countries and groups of countries, with little consensus achieved (Hanrahan and Schnepf). The 
agreed framework provides general guidelines but lacks the necessary information to lead to 
quantitative analysis. The Hong Kong Ministerial meeting of the WTO did not produce 
modalities, and the April 2006 deadline set by the WTO to provide modalities was missed. One 
is left to pick a set of “reasonable” modalities among the proposals. For this reason, we have 
chosen to base our assessment largely on elements of the Harbinson modalities and those 
common to several of the group/country proposals. The final package of reforms is likely to be 
more modest than our assumptions, which are detailed in Appendix A.  
In our analysis, we assume that the Doha Round of trade negotiations is concluded by 
2007 and the new agreement is implemented beginning in 2008. It is virtually certain that a new 
WTO agricultural agreement will embody provisions on (i) increased market access, achieved 
primarily through reductions in bound out-of-quota tariffs and increases in TRQ quantities; (ii) 
reductions in and eventual elimination of export subsidies; and (iii) reductions in the amount 
limits of the most trade-distorting forms of domestic support—amber-box measures—with 
limitations on other forms of distorting support, particularly blue-box measures, and total support 
inclusive of amber and blue boxes and de minimis support (see Appendix A). 
 The market access provisions of a new agreement are of the greatest potential 
significance for the sugar program. As we have shown earlier, the current sugar program would 
already be under stress if there were to be a significant increase in the volume of sugar imports 
from Mexico. An increase in access to the U.S. market accorded to other countries, for example, 
by increasing the TRQ for sugar or reducing over-quota tariffs could lead to additional pressure 
on the program by stimulating a further buildup in government stocks. In terms of the type of 
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new sugar program analyzed earlier, the principal issue would seem to be whether the market 
access provisions under an agreement would cause domestic sugar prices to fall significantly. If 
that happened, government expenditures on CCPs and LDPs would be considerably larger than 
the figures reported in Table 5. 
 In examining the potential implications of a WTO agreement, an additional factor that 
must be taken into account is the likely impact on international trade and prices of anticipated 
changes in the sugar program in the European Union. The European Union recently reformed its 
sugar program, the so-called Common Market Organization (CMO), which was set to expire in 
June 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 2004, 2005, 2006). The legality of the 
older CMO had been challenged successfully in the WTO by several sugar-exporting countries 
(led by Brazil, Australia, and Thailand). Also, the European Union has agreed to provide duty-
free access to its sugar market for the least-developed countries by July 2009 under its 
Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative. In light of these developments, the European Union 
reformed its policy. Because the analysis of this paper was undertaken before the new CMO was 
decided, we made assumptions based on the proposal of the EU Commission to the EU ministers 
as the basis for our own analysis (Commission of the European Communities, 2004), which 
ended up being close to the actual policy changes. Some uncertainty remains. Some legal text 
has yet to be finalized and the Commission is allowing large EU sugar exports to take place until 
the end of August 2006, irking other sugar exporters (Agranet). Our analysis assumes that the 
European Union reforms its CMO for sugar beginning in 2006, phasing out its export subsidies. 
Further, the European Union reduces both its support price and production quota for sugar (see 
Appendix A for details).  
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 Once quantified, these multilateral changes and EU reforms have an impact on world 
sugar markets but no effect on the U.S. market. The reduction in EU sugar production and 
exports associated with the reform of EU sugar policy plus some changes in other countries lead 
to a moderate increase in world sugar prices. The Caribbean FOB price of raw sugar averages 
over 4 percent higher than the baseline (without a WTO agreement). Most of the increase in 
sugar exports stimulated by the agreement is picked up by Brazil and Australia (detailed results 
available upon request). 
 In the U.S. market, the new WTO agreement is not calculated to lead to any additional 
trade changes. The U.S. TRQ already exceeds the assumed requirement that the TRQ equal at 
least 8 percent of domestic consumption; hence, it would be unchanged under the Harbinson and 
the G-20 proposals. Given the world prices that we project, the reduced out-of-quota tariff would 
still remain prohibitive. There are no additional effects of the agreement on Mexico that could 
have implications for the United States.5 
 While it seems unlikely that there will be any direct implications of a new WTO 
agreement for the U.S. sugar market, there are some important indirect implications related to 
domestic support. The change in the sugar program to a standard program would provide a 
significant credit in reduced trade-distorting amber-box support. Table 7 shows the Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) for U.S. sugar from 1995 to 2001 (the most recent data available). 
For the last three years, this averaged over $1.1 billion per year. Providing that U.S. CCPs are 
classified as a blue-box measure, and direct payments continue to be classified as a green-box 
measure, the switch to a standard commodity program will yield an AMS “credit” of over $1 
                                                 
5 We do not consider any spillover effects on other commodities (e.g., corn) that could be created by a new 
agreement, but such effects on sugar are likely to be small. In order for a final WTO agreement to be acceptable to 
other countries, there may be a requirement to provide some additional access for imports of all products, including 
sugar.  
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billion per year. Only modest LDPs (an estimated average of $23 million per year in Table 5) 
would fall under the amber-box as measured by government outlays. By contrast, the current 
sugar AMS is computed using the market price support approach based on the difference 
between administered and reference prices, which do not reflect current or actual support or 
market condition, and eligible production. A credit of this magnitude could be important in 
helping the United States meet its obligations for an overall reduction in agricultural support 
under a new WTO agreement.  
 If the sugar program were to become a standard commodity program, the potential 
contribution of sugar to the blue box through CCPs would be about $52 million. Total current 
CCPs are about $4.1 billion (Hanrahan and Schnepf). Reductions under the most stringent 
proposal (U.S. proposal) would cut blue-box support to 2.5 percent of the total value of 
production, or about $5 billion for the United States. Hence, the sugar CCPs would be “WTO 
feasible,” as the sum of existing CCPs plus the hypothetical sugar CCPs amount to less than the 
proposed limits and cuts in blue-box support under all proposals. 
6. Conclusions 
Our analysis indicates that the extension of duty-free access for imports from Mexico in 2008 
under NAFTA seems likely to undermine the ability of the U.S. sugar program to operate on a 
“no-cost” basis to U.S. taxpayers. On the assumption that the current dispute with Mexico over 
the treatment of HFCS will be resolved by that time, it seems likely that the use of HFCS in the 
Mexican beverage industry will expand considerably and that much of the sugar thereby 
displaced will seek a market in the United States. Under those conditions, marketing allotments 
could not be utilized under current legislation and prices would likely fall to the loan rate. The 
government would probably accumulate significant stocks of sugar. 
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 The replacement of the current sugar program by one similar to that used for other major 
U.S. crops likely would solve the problem of stock accumulation. It also seems that such a 
program could more easily accommodate most of the effects of further trade liberalization under 
a new WTO agreement or future bilateral trade agreements unless a very large TRQ expansion 
emerges form the Doha negotiations. The latter is not likely. An analysis of recent proposals 
suggests that a WTO agreement is unlikely to impose significant adjustment pressures on the 
U.S. sugar market, beyond those that will be created by NAFTA. The adoption of a standard 
program would, however, make it easier for the United States to meet its commitments on 
reductions in trade-distorting amber-box support under a new WTO agreement. 
 The replacement of the current sugar program by a standard commodity program would 
increase the costs of the program for U.S. taxpayers but would also lower costs for U.S. sugar 
users. Given reasonable assumptions about possible program parameters, the principal program 
cost would likely be through direct payments, rather than through CCPs or LDPs. These costs 
could be lower than the maximum estimated in this report because of limitations on payments to 
individual producers. The bottom line is that a shift to a “standard” program would not involve 
significant outlays. Regardless of the starting point, costs are expected to average in the range of 
$250 to $450 million on an annual basis depending on assumptions. Many of the challenges 
associated with actually implementing such a program have not been fully addressed. Payment 
limits are an issue that quickly comes to mind (Roney, 2006a), but others, such as how the 
processing sector would fund itself or the possibility of other infrastructure financing issues, also 
loom. 
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Box 1. The Evolution of U.S. Sugar Policy 
 The Jones-Costigan Act of 1934 relied upon domestic production and import quotas to 
support the producer price of sugar. A series of sugar acts with similar characteristics 
continued in force until December 31, 1974, when record world sugar prices prompted the 
removal of domestic production restrictions on sugar. High sugar prices did not last. A price 
support program was instituted in 1977. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 created a non-
recourse loan program. Sugar processors who agreed to pay sugar producers established 
minimum prices could obtain a loan using sugar as collateral. They could subsequently repay 
the loan plus interest if market prices were sufficiently high, or forfeit the sugar to the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In order to reduce the risk that the government would 
accumulate large stocks, a “market price objective” was established; import duties and fees 
were applied to regulate the volume of imports and to support domestic market prices. In 
1981 a system of country-by-country quotas was introduced to provide greater control over 
sugar imports. 
 With the exception of 1980 and 1981, when market prices were high, a series of sugar 
programs has provided price support through a loan rate system and crucial embodied 
controls on imports. The Food Security Act of 1985 introduced the requirement that the 
program be operated at “no cost” to the federal government. The total domestic supply was to 
be regulated to ensure that the government did not accumulate stocks of sugar. In addition to 
the existing controls over imports, the 1990 Farm Act provided for the use of marketing 
controls on domestic sugar in the event that imports were projected to fall below a minimum 
level of 1.25 million short tons, raw value. Under the Uruguay Round Agreement of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994, the United States agreed to import a 
minimum quantity of 1.256 million tons of raw and refined sugar each marketing year 
(October–September). Included in this amount is 24,251 tons of refined sugar.  
 The 1996 Food and Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act converted import 
quotas to TRQs. Loans under the loan rate system were non-recourse if the TRQ was set at 
1.5 million tons or greater and recourse if the TRQ was less than that amount. Under the 
recourse loan, the CCC can demand repayment of the loan at maturity, regardless of the 
market price of sugar. Other changes were introduced in the legislation. The marketing 
controls on domestic sugar and the no-cost requirement were both eliminated. Additional 
charges were introduced: penalties for the forfeiture of beet sugar to the CCC; interest charges
on loans set at one percentage point about the CCC’s cost of borrowing; and marketing 
assessments paid by processors to help cover program costs.  
 The current sugar program under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
established loan rates to processors of 18¢ per pound for cane sugar and 22.9¢ per pound for 
refined beet sugar. Loans are non-recourse and may be taken for a maximum term of nine
months. The marketing assessments, forfeiture penalty, and the interest rate premium on loans 
were all eliminated. The legislation allows for a payment-in-kind program, which had been 
originally offered for sugar in 2000 and 2001. When such a program is in operation, 
producers can forgo planting or harvesting sugar in exchange for CCC sugar inventory. The 
no-cost provision was reinstated. In order to achieve this, marketing allotments were 
reinstated, but these can only be applied when imports for domestic consumption are less than 
1.532 million short tons. Given the destruction of crops by hurricanes in summer 2005, 
additional imports have been allowed to make up for the unanticipated domestic shortfall 
without compromising the allotment system. For more information, see Jurenas, and Mitchell.
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Box 2. NAFTA and the Sweetener Markets 
NAFTA—a treaty to establish a free trade area between Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States—went into effect on January 1, 1994. The provisions relating to trade in sugar with 
Mexico have significant implications for the U.S. sugar and HFCS markets. 
 NAFTA allowed for a 15-year transition period for exports of Mexican sugar to the 
United States. The original agreement provided that during the first six years, duty-free 
access was allowed for 7,258 metric tons of raw cane sugar. Additional quantities could be 
exported to the United States if Mexico had net production surplus, defined as domestic 
sugar production minus consumption, over a two-year period. Beginning in year 7, the 
maximum duty-free access was to be 150,000 metric tons and would increase by 10 percent 
in each subsequent year. In order to obtain congressional approval for NAFTA, the Mexican 
and U.S. governments exchanged “side letters” that modified some of these provisions. The 
key changes were that Mexico would only be considered a net-surplus producer if its sugar 
production exceeded domestic consumption of both sugar and HFCS and that duty-free 
access of up to a maximum of 250,000 tons would be provided from 2001-07 on that basis. 
There was a subsequent difference of opinion between the two governments on the validity 
and interpretation of the side-letter provisions, but these provisions have been applied by 
the United States. For the future, the more important provision of the NAFTA agreement is 
that tariffs on Mexican sugar, which are being gradually reduced over the transition period, 
will be zero by calendar year 2008. At that time, Mexico will no longer be subject to the 
surplus producer condition. 
 In addition to the conditions attached to sugar, there has been an ongoing dispute 
with Mexico on imports of HFCS from the United States. NAFTA called for unlimited 
access of the product to the Mexican market and the progressive reduction of the tariff from 
15 percent in 1994 to zero in 2004. There has been a series of disputes with Mexico over 
imports of HFCS. The Mexican government imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of 
HFCS from the United States in 1998. These were subsequently challenged through the 
WTO and through the NAFTA dispute-settlement process. In January 2002, the Mexican 
Congress imposed a 20 percent tax on soft drinks using HFCS. This was denounced by U.S. 
producers of HFCS as a violation of NAFTA. In July 2004, the WTO agreed to a request by 
the United States to establish a dispute settlement panel on the tax measure. In October 
2005, the panel report found that the Mexican soft drink tax was inconsistent with article 
III: 2 and 4, and not justified by article XX of GATT 1994. Mexico appealed the panel 
ruling in December 2005. In March 2006, the Appellate Body of the WTO ruled against 
Mexico and upheld the decision of the panel (WTO, 2006b and 2006c). 
During this slow legal process, sweetener industries in both countries have held 
cooperative negotiations to consider their future under joint open borders. These 
negotiations were aimed at resuming trade without major disruptions. The negotiations were
interrupted in 2005-06 but may resume with the approaching end of the WTO dispute 
(Roney, 2006b).  
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Table 1. U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Supply, Utilization, and Prices 
      1 2 3 4   5 = 2-1  6 = 3-1  7 = 4-2 
    
    
    
      
Low Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
High Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario 
High Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario   
High Import 
Baseline - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
High Import 
Standard 
Program - 
High Import 
Baseline 
   (Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Sugar allotment  8,564 n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sugar production  8,591 8,287 9,088 8,630  -303 497 343 
Sugar imports  1,847 2,984 1,767 2,919  1,137 -80 -64 
  (of which, duty-free NAFTA) 218 1,355 138 1,290  1,137 -80 -64 
Sugar domestic deliveries 10,177 10,906 10,586 11,273  728 409 367 
Sugar exports  213 216 217 220  3 4 3 
Sugar ending stocks  2,050 2,709 2,085 2,148  658 35 -560 
  (of which, CCC stocks) 87 1,066 0 0  979 -87 -1,066 
Sugar-containing product         
  net imports  563 541 537 518  -22 -26 -23 
   (Thousand short tons, calendar year 2008-2015 average) 
HFCS production  9,183 8,990 8,932 8,766  -193 -251 -224 
HFCS domestic use  8,951 8,167 8,692 7,939  -784 -259 -228 
HFCS net exports  232 823 240 827  591 8 4 
   (Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
N.Y. spot raw sugar  20.60 18.73 18.42 16.86  -1.87 -2.17 -1.87 
Refined beet sugar  23.64 21.05 20.63 18.45  -2.59 -3.02 -2.60 
Retail refined sugar  44.02 41.09 40.55 37.99  -2.93 -3.47 -3.10 
HFCS, 42%, Midwest (cal. yr.) 12.04 11.38 11.20 10.66  -0.65 -0.84 -0.72 
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 Table 2. U.S. Sugar Beet Production, Prices, and Returns 
      1 2 3 4    5 = 2-1  6 = 3-1  7 = 4-2 
    
    
    
      
Low Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
High Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario 
High Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario   
High Import 
Baseline - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
High Import 
Standard 
Program - 
High Import 
Baseline 
   (Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
U.S. sugar beet production 28,350 26,970 29,688 28,362  -1,380 1,338 1,392 
  California  1,713 1,625 1,807 1,701  -88 94 76 
  Colorado   689 646 702 659  -43 13 13 
  Idaho   5,224 4,953 5,461 5,138  -271 237 185 
  Michigan  3,134 2,965 3,086 2,918  -169 -47 -47 
  Minnesota  9,209 8,802 9,739 9,427  -406 531 624 
  Montana   1,202 1,141 1,271 1,216  -62 69 75 
  Nebraska  781 736 809 738  -44 29 2 
  North Dakota  5,202 4,970 5,633 5,444  -232 431 474 
  Ohio   37 35 36 34  -2 -1 -1 
  Oregon   342 326 332 316  -16 -10 -11 
  Washington  146 139 141 134  -7 -4 -5 
  Wyoming  672 632 669 637  -40 -2 5 
   (Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Refined beet sugar price 23.64 21.05 20.63 18.45  -2.59 -3.02 -2.60 
   (Dollars per ton, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Sugar beet price  40.38 37.08 36.55 33.79  -3.29 -3.82 -3.29 
   (Dollars per acre, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Gross market returns  920.08 844.78 833.59 769.97  -75.31 -86.49 -74.81 
Variable expenses  488.50 488.50 488.50 488.50  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Net market return  431.58 356.27 345.09 281.47  -75.31 -86.49 -74.81 
Loan deficiency payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.33  0.00 0.00 18.33 
Countercyclical payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.61  0.00 0.00 12.61 
Direct payment  0.00 0.00 164.06 164.06  0.00 164.06 164.06 
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Table 3. U.S. Sugarcane Production, Prices, and Returns 
      1 2 3 4    5 = 2-1  6 = 3-1  7 = 4-2 
    
    
    
      
Low Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
High Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario 
High Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario   
High Import 
Baseline - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
High Import 
Standard 
Program - 
High Import 
Baseline 
   (Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
U.S. sugarcane production 31,279 30,673 33,471 31,566  -606 2,192 893 
  Florida   15,095 14,977 16,107 15,069  -118 1,012 92 
  Hawaii   1,779 1,085 973 361  -693 -806 -724 
  Louisiana  12,893 13,093 14,660 14,454  200 1,767 1,362 
  Texas   1,512 1,518 1,731 1,682  6 219 164 
   (Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
N.Y. raw sugar price  20.60 18.73 18.42 16.86  -1.87 -2.17 -1.87 
   (Dollars per ton, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Sugarcane price  27.81 25.33 24.93 22.86  -2.47 -2.87 -2.47 
   (Dollars per acre, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Gross market returns  1014.32 910.08 890.34 804.89  -104.25 -123.98 -105.19 
Variable expenses  748.45 748.45 748.45 748.45  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Net market return  265.87 161.63 141.89 56.44  -104.25 -123.98 -105.19 
Loan deficiency payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Countercyclical payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.73  0.00 0.00 16.73 
Direct payment  0.00 0.00 217.57 217.57  0.00 217.57 217.57 
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Table 4. U.S. Corn Use and Price 
      1 2 3 4    5 = 2-1  6 = 3-1  7 = 4-2 
    
    
    
      
Low Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
High Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario 
High Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario   
High Import 
Baseline - 
Low Import  
Baseline  
Low Import 
Standard 
Program - 
Low Import  
Baseline  
High Import 
Standard 
Program - 
High Import  
Baseline  
   (Million bushels, crop year 2007/08-2014/15 average) 
Corn for HFCS production 539 528 525 515  -11 -15 -13 
   (Dollars per bushel, crop year 2007/08-2014/15 average) 
U.S. corn farm price  2.329 2.326 2.325 2.323  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
 
Table 5. U.S. Government Program Costs 
      1 2 3 4    5 = 2-1  6 = 3-1  7 = 4-2 
    
    
    
      
Low Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
High Import 
Baseline 
Scenario 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario 
High Import 
Standard 
Program 
Scenario   
High Import 
Baseline - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
Low Import 
Standard 
Program - 
Low Import 
Baseline 
High Import 
Standard 
Program - 
High Import 
Baseline 
   (Million dollars, fiscal year 2008-2015 average) 
Sugar direct payments 0 0 463 463  0 463 463 
Sugar countercyclical payments 0 0 0 36  0 0 36 
Sugar loan deficiency payments 0 0 0 23  0 0 23 
  Sub-total  0 0 463 521  0 463 521 
Other sugar costs (loans, etc.) 8 175 -1 -1  167 -9 -176 
Sugar total costs  8 175 462 520  167 454 345 
Corn countercyclical payments 221 233 238 250  12 16 16 
Sugar total + corn CCPs 229 408 699 770  179 471 362 
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Table 6. Parameters Assumed for a Standard Commodity Program for Sugar 
 
 Beet  Cane 
Loan Rate 16.48¢ per pound 12¢ per pound 
Direct payment (per pound) 3¢ per pound, raw sugar 
equivalent 
3¢ per pound 
Target price 20¢ per pound, raw sugar 
equivalent 
20¢ per pound 
Base area 1.5 million acres 1.0 million acres 
Base yield 3.2 tons per acre, raw sugar 
equivalent 
4.3 tons per acre 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. U.S. Aggregate Measure of Support for Sugar 
 
Year 
Administered  
Price 
External  
Reference Price 
Eligible  
Production AMS 
 (dollars/metric ton) (million MT) (million dollars) 
 
1995 
 
396.83 
 
230.82 
 
6.67 
 
1,108 
1996 374.79 230.82 6.51 937 
1997 374.79 230.82 7.26 1,045 
1998 374.79 230.82 7.59 1,093 
1999 374.79 230.82 8.20 1,180 
2000 374.79 230.82 7.87 1,133 
2001 374.79 230.82 7.17 1,032 
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Appendix A. Further Details on Assumptions for Each of the Scenarios 
The major macroeconomic assumptions used in our analysis are summarized in Tables A1-A5. 
 
Baseline 
In calculating the allotments applied in the two variants of the baseline, we use the following 
formula: Allotment = Sugar deliveries + 0.185 * (Sugar deliveries + Sugar exports) - Beginning 
stocks - 1,532,000 tons. The 0.185 factor was that used by USDA in setting fiscal 2005 
allotments to reflect a normal stock-to-use ratio. 
 
Standard Program 
Except for loan rates, beet sugar provisions are expressed in raw sugar equivalents. 
Countercyclical payment rates for both cane and beet sugar are determined by the following 
formula: max (0, (Target price - Direct payment rate - NY raw sugar price)). 
 Program base areas and yields are based on 1998-2001 averages. The sugar beet base 
area is set equal to 1998-2001 average planted area, while the sugarcane base area is set equal to 
1998-2001 average area harvested for sugar and seed. The program yields are set equal to the 
respective yields of raw sugar equivalent per acre harvested for sugar. Alternative rules could 
have been used; the rules selected mimic those used in setting program provisions for peanuts in 
2002 farm legislation. 
 Under the marketing loan provisions for other crops, producers have the ability to repay 
loans based on a loan repayment price if that is lower than the loan rate plus interest. How this 
loan repayment price would be set for sugar is an important question for which there is no 
obvious answer. For wheat, feed grains, and oilseeds, posted county prices (PCPs) are the loan 
repayment rates. PCPs are set using a complicated formula that ultimately ties local county 
prices to terminal market prices. For cotton and rice, loan repayment rates are tied to adjusted 
world prices that are linked to world market developments. Neither approach seems directly 
applicable to sugar. For purposes of our analysis, we assume that the average loan repayment 
rate for sugar will be 2¢ per pound below the average market price. This is arbitrary but is 
consistent with the experience in other crops, in which loan repayment rates are almost always at 
least slightly lower than observed market prices. This ensures that farmers rarely have an 
incentive to forfeit commodities in lieu of repaying loans. 
 
Trade Liberalization Assumptions 
Although a framework for reforms was approved by the WTO in July 2004, modalities of the 
reforms have not been defined. Several countries (the European Union and United States) and 
groups of countries (G-5, G-10, and G-20) have issued proposals with detailed yet incomplete 
modalities (Hanrahan and Schnepf). The only proposal emanating from the WTO itself is the 
Harbinson draft. The latter was not successful either. It is not clear what the final modalities will 
look like, as negotiations have been difficult. We used the information included in the Harbinson 
proposal (WTO, 2003) and some additional assumptions from recent proposals (Hanrahan and 
Schnepf) in evaluating the impact of a WTO agreement. All these proposals have many common 
elements of reforms but differ on modalities on tariff cuts, treatments of sensitive products, and 
minimum market access for these products. We reduce the installment period for developing 
countries to five years, given the constraints on the time horizon used in the baseline for our 
study; hence, we overstate the degree of reform in developing countries.  
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 There are three types of trade policy reforms under this scenario: tariff-rate quota (TRQ) 
expansion to a minimum share of a reference consumption level; a decrease in bound tariff using 
a tiered system; and the elimination of export subsidies, with the value and volume of subsidized 
exports going to zero.  
Market access—TRQs 
We use the same approach for tariff cuts and minimum TRQ increases. Rather than applying an 
average increase, we assume that countries will act strategically to achieve a 10 percent average 
increase with up to a 12 percent increase in marginal TRQs to offset the 8 percent minimum on 
“key” products. We monitor current levels of TRQ fill in the TRQ expansion. The fill rate is 
often less than 100 percent but the TRQ expansion may go to low-cost producers. The fill rate 
could also decrease when the U.S. producer price (and the new EU reference price) decline. We 
assume that for a quota fill of less than 60 percent the increase in the quota does not lead to an 
actual increase in sugar imports because the under-fill is so substantial. 
Developed WTO members: 
TRQ volume increases to a minimum of 8 percent of domestic consumption based on the 2003-
04 average (a 1999-2000 average was used in the original Harbinson proposal) in five equal 
increments. We assume no change in in-quota tariffs. 
Developing WTO members: 
TRQ volume increases to a minimum of 5 percent of domestic consumption with respect to 
2003-04 average consumption (1999-2000 was specified in Harbinson), in five increments. 
There were 10 increments in the Harbinson proposal but that was shortened here to fit our period 
of analysis. We assume no change in in-quota tariffs. 
 As shown in Table A6, the TRQ expansion affects only Colombia, South Africa, and the 
Philippines. Many countries do not fill their TRQ (less than 60 percent of TRQ filled in recent 
years), and these countries already have a TRQ higher than 8 percent of their consumption for 
developed-country WTO members or 5 percent for developing-country WTO members. The 
combination of these two factors (substantial under-fill and large nominal TRQ) means that only 
three major countries have an actual import increase under the TRQ expansion.  
Market access—bound tariffs 
We use the minimum tariff line cuts in the Harbinson proposal, not the average reduction, under 
the assumption that countries will act strategically to meet the average proportional reduction 
criteria without any consequence for sugar other than the minimum cut. We use applied or MFN 
rates in our analysis, not the bound rates. We monitor bound and applied rates in each country to 
determine when there is “water” in the tariffs (tariff redundancy) and thus when an effective 
tariff change is likely to occur. The bound and applied tariffs for major countries and the implied 
reductions in applied tariffs are given in Table A7. 
Developed WTO members 
Bound tariffs cuts are in five equal installments. The minimum line cuts are as follows. For 
tariffs above 90 percent, minimum line reduction is 45 percent in five equal installments. For 
tariffs in the range of 15-90 percent, the minimum line cut is 35 percent in five equal 
installments. For tariffs below 15 percent, the minimum line cut is 25 percent in five equal 
installments. 
Developing WTO members 
For tariffs above 120 percent, there is 30 percent reduction per line in five equal installments. For 
tariffs above 60 and below 120 percent, there is 25 percent minimum line reduction in five equal 
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installments. For tariffs between 20 and 60 percent, there is 20 percent reduction. For tariffs 
under 20 percent, there is 17 percent reduction in five installments. 
 We assume that sugar will not be declared a “sensitive” product by any developing 
country and therefore will not be subject to lower tariff reductions than agreed upon for this 
group of countries as a whole. As shown in Table A7, the changes in applied out-of-quota tariffs 
are modest because bound tariffs are very high and many countries have applied tariffs lower 
than the final bound tariffs that would result from the implementation of a Doha agreement. 
Export subsidies  
This reform component has the strongest impact on the sugar market but through one market 
participant (the European Union). The changes are as follows. 
Developed WTO members 
If the sector outlay represents at least 50 percent of all outlays, then there is a 30 percent 
reduction annually in the previous year’s outlay for five years, dropping to zero in year 6. This 
probably will not apply to sugar. For all other subsidies, there is a 25 percent reduction of the 
previous year’s outlay for five years, then to zero in year 6. The export volume commitment is 
also cut 30 percent annually from its previous year’s level for five years. 
Developing WTO members 
If the sector outlay represents at least 50 percent of all outlays, there is a 25 percent decrease 
from the previous year’s outlay, annually for five years, then to zero by year 6. Actual cuts in 
export subsidies for developing countries may be more modest. For all other export subsidies, 
there is a 20 percent reduction from the previous year’s outlay for five years, then to zero in year 
6. This keeps us within the 10-year baseline period for our study (the Harbinson proposal had a 
12-year implementation period). 
 As may be deduced from Tables A8 and A9, the reduction in export subsidies is likely to 
have the largest impact on international markets. The reduction in EU export subsidies induces a 
one-for-one permanent decrease in production under quota. The affected exports are non-ACP 
subsidized exports (about 1.273 million metric tons [mmt] of white sugar) but not the 1.6 mmt of 
ACP re-exports, which are also subsidized but not part of the WTO commitment. These are 
covered by a 2005 WTO ruling that was appealed and arbitrated but is still unresolved as of May 
2006. In fall 2005, the European Union actually antagonized concerned parties by announcing an 
expansion of exports of C sugar of about 2 mmt by declassifying quota sugar (WTO, 2006a). If 
ACP re-exports finally count as subsidized exports to be eliminated, the European Union is 
expected to become an even larger importer because production will fall by an additional 1.27 
mmt. We do not include the ACP re-exports as part of the export subsidy reform because these 
are still part of the unresolved WTO dispute. The elimination of the latter would intensify the 
necessary reductions in EU sugar production and the resulting increase in world prices. 
Domestic support reductions 
Blue box  
Blue box support is cut by 50 percent in equal installments for five years for developed members 
to 2.5 percent of the value of production, and there is a 33 percent reduction over five 
installments for developing members (10 years in Harbinson). The G-5 proposal stipulates that 
blue-box payments should not exceed 5 percent of a reference average production value. This 
may be relevant for U.S. CCPs if they are shifted to the blue box. The G-20 and G-10 proposals 
do not address the blue-box support as a separate category.   
Amber box/AMS+de minimis 
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A 60 percent reduction is implemented in equal installments on bound AMS over five years in 
developed members. There is a 20 percent decrease as a down payment in year 1 and then equal 
reductions (10 percent of initial support) in the next four years. There is a 40 percent reduction in 
bound AMS in five equal installments for developing members (given the baseline horizon) with 
a 20 percent decrease the first year, then a linear decrease in the next four years of 5 percent of 
the initial support level. De minimis support is reduced by 0.5 point for five years (new de 
minimis is 2.5 percent). These modalities and schedules translate into little or no actual change 
for most countries and little change in sugar markets. 
Total trade distorting support (amber + blue-box) reductions  
This reduction is included in several proposals. This is not an issue relevant for sugar, as its 
amber-box component would dramatically decrease by about $1 billion. 
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Table A1. Population Growth Projections (percent change from previous year) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major Exporters             
 Australia 0.92 0.89 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.70 
 Brazil 1.14 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.80 
 European Union-15 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.06 
 European Union-New Member States -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.12 
 Mexico 1.20 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.05 
 Thailand 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.65 0.62 0.59 0.56 
Major Importers             
 Canada 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.78 
 China 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.63 
 India 1.46 1.43 1.40 1.37 1.35 1.32 1.29 1.27 1.25 1.23 1.20 1.18 
 Indonesia 1.52 1.48 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.31 1.27 1.23 1.20 1.16 1.12 1.08 
 Japan 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.23 -0.27 -0.30 
 Russia and Ukraine -0.49 -0.45 -0.43 -0.41 -0.41 -0.40 -0.40 -0.40 -0.41 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43 
 United States 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.84 
 
Table A2. Real GDP Growth Projections (percent change from previous year) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major Exporters             
 Australia 3.71 3.27 2.86 2.68 2.69 2.76 2.71 2.69 2.65 2.66 2.65 2.61 
 Brazil 4.00 4.10 4.08 4.03 4.28 4.30 4.15 4.19 4.06 4.02 4.06 4.10 
 European Union-15 2.05 2.26 2.39 2.13 2.09 2.08 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.07 2.09 
 European Union-New Member States 5.00 4.78 4.65 4.54 4.34 4.07 3.94 4.13 4.10 3.95 4.00 4.05 
 Mexico 3.63 3.65 3.66 3.67 3.68 3.69 3.70 3.66 3.69 3.72 3.76 3.80 
 Thailand 7.23 6.01 5.35 5.18 5.40 5.51 5.60 5.75 5.99 5.83 5.53 5.38 
Major Importers             
 Canada 3.00 3.55 3.32 3.16 3.12 3.11 3.10 3.02 2.80 2.57 2.40 2.31 
 China 8.64 7.23 7.01 7.02 6.79 6.78 6.56 6.35 6.27 6.27 6.37 6.26 
 India 6.39 6.16 5.49 5.73 5.85 5.58 5.53 5.51 5.47 5.45 5.39 5.31 
 Indonesia 4.73 5.00 4.81 4.76 4.63 4.61 4.72 4.87 4.76 4.80 4.82 4.62 
 Japan 4.06 2.55 1.97 1.86 1.76 1.66 1.61 1.61 1.63 1.66 1.71 1.70 
 Russia and Ukraine 6.30 5.27 4.58 4.57 4.26 3.82 3.82 3.48 3.66 3.88 3.89 3.83 
 United States 4.27 3.32 2.90 3.17 2.88 2.96 3.08 3.07 3.02 3.23 3.50 3.26 
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Table A3. GDP Deflator Growth Projections (percent change from previous year) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Major Exporters              
 Australia 2.39 2.80 1.97 1.47 2.68 2.53 2.49 2.50 2.60 2.57 2.55 2.54  
 Brazil 7.42 8.22 8.02 7.33 7.87 7.63 7.56 7.49 7.41 7.34 7.27 7.20  
 European Union-15 3.16 1.64 1.71 1.61 1.76 1.89 1.90 1.92 1.89 1.89 1.90 1.89  
 European Union-New Member States 1.02 6.22 2.80 2.97 2.49 2.48 2.38 2.46 2.26 2.52 2.46 2.40  
 Mexico 6.05 4.41 4.39 4.34 4.34 4.33 4.33 4.34 4.34 4.36 4.37 4.39  
 Thailand 2.51 2.35 2.26 2.39 2.53 2.62 2.75 2.91 3.00 3.05 3.08 2.97  
Major Importers              
 Canada 2.41 1.08 1.43 1.50 1.70 1.94 1.95 1.81 1.73 1.71 1.78 1.91  
 China 3.67 4.90 4.05 3.75 3.38 3.10 3.11 3.23 3.39 3.38 3.27 3.26  
 India 5.70 5.10 5.00 5.10 5.30 4.68 4.51 4.64 4.66 4.58 4.50 4.43  
 Indonesia 5.33 5.43 5.29 4.32 4.00 3.95 3.92 3.96 4.02 4.05 4.08 4.10  
 Japan -1.70 -0.34 0.37 1.12 1.46 1.66 1.85 1.96 2.04 2.11 2.12 2.11  
 Russia 12.42 8.99 8.11 7.36 6.70 6.23 5.91 5.46 5.25 5.16 4.97 4.91  
 Ukraine 8.43 7.01 5.92 5.50 5.20 4.50 4.20 4.20 4.50 4.10 4.00 4.00  
 United States 2.11 1.94 1.71 1.89 1.97 1.98 2.13 2.34 2.34 2.17 2.19 2.26  
 
Table A4. Exchange Rate Growth Projections - Local Currency per U.S. Dollar (percent change from previous year) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Major Exporters             
 Australia -10.04 1.10 -0.83 -0.37 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.31 -0.32 -0.33 
 Brazil -1.14 6.19 5.88 6.71 4.25 4.22 3.86 3.84 3.81 3.79 3.76 3.73 
 European Union -8.85 -1.89 -0.95 -3.34 -1.08 -0.31 -0.33 -0.34 -0.30 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23 
 Mexico 4.75 2.41 4.37 5.79 4.33 4.62 6.35 4.81 4.44 4.11 3.73 4.43 
 Thailand -3.36 -1.12 -1.75 -1.77 -1.27 -0.86 -0.97 -0.75 -0.94 -0.92 -0.62 -0.73 
Major Importers             
 Canada -4.70 -1.48 -3.07 -3.79 -1.04 -0.92 -0.76 -0.54 -0.40 -0.57 -0.65 -0.56 
 China 0.00 0.00 -2.35 -4.36 -3.51 -2.02 -1.00 -1.00 -0.36 0.28 0.20 0.12 
 India -2.11 3.99 2.04 1.48 2.08 1.92 1.77 1.70 1.66 1.61 1.54 1.49 
 Indonesia 3.23 -4.47 -3.13 0.57 1.05 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.97 1.00 1.02 
 Japan -7.67 -5.81 -3.35 -0.49 -1.10 -1.55 -1.37 -1.02 -0.75 -0.50 -0.28 -0.07 
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Table A5. Analysis of the Increase in Sugar Tariff-Rate Quotas (TRQs)
Countries TRQ Recent fill Consumption TRQ expansion
(tmt) rate threshold 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
Colombia 57 78% 70 60 62 65 68 70 70 70 70
European Union 25 1,590 100% 1,410 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590
South Africa 62 100% 129 75 89 102 116 129 129 129 129
Thailand 14 0% 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Mexico 184 54% 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184
China 1,945 42% 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945 1,945
Morocco 274 187% 82 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274
Philippines 64 100% 100 71 78 85 93 100 100 100 100
United States 1,229 83% 777 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229 1,229
Venezuela 132 250% 68 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Notes:
1. If the fill rate is less than 60 percent then no expansion is assumed.
2. Fill rate estimated by using TRQ notification if recent or gain reports if dated notification.
3. TRQ increase is up to 8 percent of average 2002-3 consumption if developed countries fill their TRQ at least at 60 percent
and if the current TRQ is less than 8 percent of consumption.
4. The consumption threshold is only 5 percent for developing members of the WTO.  
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Table A6. Bound and Applied Tariffs and Implied Reductions in Applied Tariffs
WTO Bound Level Reduction Implied
Country Status Uruguay Doha in Doha Applied reduction in
Final Modality Modality Tariffs applied tariff
ARGENTINA Developing 35 28 7 23 0
AUSTRALIA Developed 24 16 8 0 0
BRAZIL Developing 35 28 7 16 0
CANADA Developed 11 8 3 9 0
COLOMBIA Developing 117 88 29 20 0
CUBA Developing 40 32 8 10 0
EGYPT Developing 20 17 3 5 0
EUROPEAN UNION Developed 194 107 87 194 87
INDIA Developing 150 105 45 65 0
INDONESIA Developing 95 71 24 31 0
JAPAN Developed 353 194 159 353 159
KOREA Developing 18 15 3 5 0
MALAYSIA Developing 17 15 3 0 0
MEXICO Developing 212 148 64 233 85
MOROCCO Developing 168 118 50 35 0
PAKISTAN Developing 150 105 45 35 0
PERU Developing 68 51 17 25 0
PHILIPPINES Developing 50 40 10 65 25
SOUTH AFRICA Developed 105 58 47 65 7
THAILAND Developing 94 71 24 65 0
TURKEY Developing 135 95 41 137 42
UNITED STATES Developed 210 116 95 195 79
VENEZUELA Developing 105 79 26 20 0
CHINA Developing 50 40 10 50 10
Notes:
1. Countries covered individually in the sugar model. Other countries are aggregated under a "Rest of the World" category.
2. Calculations include: Column F=D*(1-E/100); Column G= D minus F; Column I = H minus F.
3. Bound and applied specific tariffs have been converted to an ad valorem equivalent.
4. The EU-25 includes New Member States and all countries incorporate EU tariff policy after 2004.  
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Table A7.  Export Subsidy Notifications for Major Exporters and Importers 
Algeria Not a WTO member
Argentina Notified no export subsidies in 2002 or 2003
Australia Notified no export subsidies in 2002 or 2003
Brazil No subsidy in 1996 reported in 2003
Canada No export subsidies applied to sugar
China 2004 notification of no export subsidies applied in 2002 or 2003
Colombia 2001 notification of no subsidies in 2000
Cuba Notified no subsides applied in 2002. 
Egypt 1999 notification of no export subsidies in 1998 and beyond
European Union 1,273.5 tmt white sugar and  499.1 million  euros commitments nearly binding in recent years.
Implied reduction = volume commitment
Former Soviet Union No subsidies used in Georgia. Russia is not a WTO member
India No subsidies
Indonesia No sugar export subsidy notification
Iran Not a WTO member
Japan 2004 notification of no export subsidies applied in 2003 
Malaysia 2000 notification of no export subsidies used in 1997 and 1998
Mexico Notified in 2002 that no export subsidies were used in 1996
Morocco 2003 notification of no sugar subsidies in 2001
Pakistan 2001 notification of no subsidies on sugar for 2000
Peru 2003 notification of no sugar subsidies in 2002
Philippines 2004 notification of no export subsidies in 2002 or 2003
South Africa Some subsidized exports notified in 2000 and 2002 (2.1% of volume target) . Reduction of exports = 2.1% 
South Korea 2002 notification of no sugar export subsidies in 2000
Thailand 2004 notification of no export subsidies in 2002 
Turkey 2001 notification of no subsidies on sugar for 2000
United States 2004 notification of no subsidies on sugar in 2002
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Table A8. Implied Change in EU-15 Production Quota (thousand metric tons) 
with the Reduction in Export Subsidies 
 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 
Net baseline 
quota level 
14,275 13,400 12,984 12,568 11,508 11,508 11,508 11,508 11,508 11,508 11,508 
Export subsidy 
reduction 
0 0 0 382 
 
267 
 
187 
 
131 
 
92 
 
214 
 
0 
 
0 
 
Net quota in 
trade reform 
scenario 
14,275 13,400 12,984 12,186 10,858 10,671 10,540 10,448 10,235 10,234 10,234 
  
 
Appendix B. Impact of Payment Limitations 
Payment limits set the maximum amount of commodity program benefits an individual or entity 
can receive by law. Under the 2002 Farm Act, payment limits per individual or entity are 
$40,000 for direct payments, $65,000 for countercyclical payments, and $75,000 for loan-
deficiency payments/marketing assistance loan gains. Under the Act’s three-entity rule, 
individuals can receive program payments from up to three separate entities engaged in farming 
operations, effectively doubling the payment limits per individual. The 2002 Farm Act also 
established a $2.5 million adjusted gross income (AGI) cap. An individual or entity whose AGI 
exceeds $2.5 million is not eligible for payments unless 75 percent or more of AGI is derived 
from farming, ranching, or forestry operations. 
 At a direct payment rate of $164 per acre for sugar beets,6 a farmer not taking advantage 
of the three-entity rule would encounter the $40,000 payment limit at 244 or more acres of beets. 
Taking advantage of the three-entity rule to double the limit to $80,000 would raise the threshold 
number of beet acres to 488. In the case of sugarcane, at a direct payment rate of $218 per acre, a 
farmer not taking advantage of the three-entity rule would encounter the payment limit at 183 or 
more acres of cane. Taking advantage of the three-entity rule would raise the threshold number 
of cane acres to 366. These thresholds would be lower for farmers already receiving direct 
payments for other program crops because those payments count toward the limit. Sugar beet 
farms often produce significant amounts of wheat and, to a lesser extent, corn. Production of 
other program crops is less common among sugarcane farms, the major exception being rice 
production by some Louisiana sugarcane growers. 
 About one-seventh (14 percent) of sugar beet farms have 500 or more acres of sugar 
beets, and they account for 41 percent of total U.S. sugar beet acreage and 40 percent of total 
U.S. sugar beet production (Ali). About one-fifth (22 percent) of sugar beet farms have between 
250 and 499 acres of sugar beets, and they account for 29 percent of total sugar beet acreage and 
30 percent of total production. For sugarcane, about one-fifth (22 percent) of growers have farm 
sizes of 2,000 or more acres, and they account for 69 percent of total U.S. sugarcane acreage and 
71 percent of total U.S. sugarcane production (USDA-NASS, 2002). An additional 45 percent of 
sugarcane growers have farm sizes between 500 and 1,999 acres, and these growers account for 
28 percent of total sugarcane acreage and 25 percent of total production. 
 The number of sugar beet farms in the United States declined from 8,810 in 1992 to 
5,027 in 2002, and average sugar beet acreage per farm increased from 164 to 272 during this 
                                                 
6 A direct payment of 3¢ per pound for beet sugar is equivalent to $164 per acre of beets, given the figures we use 
for program yields and sugar recovery rates. Similarly, a direct payment of 3¢ per pound for cane sugar is equivalent 
to $218 per acre of cane. 
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period (USDA-NASS, 1992, 2002). In sugarcane, the trends were less pronounced but similar in 
direction: the number of sugarcane farms declined from 1,031 in 1992 to 953 in 2002, and 
average sugarcane acreage per farm increased from 857 to 1,027. If these trends continue, the 
proportion of total sugar beet and sugarcane acreage operated by farms that could be subject to 
payment limits would be higher in the future than it is today. 
 The degree to which payment limits would actually restrict payments to sugar beet or 
sugarcane growers is uncertain. A 2003 report by the Commission on the Application of 
Payment Limitations for Agriculture concluded that producers have many options for 
reorganizing their farm businesses in ways that reduce the effects of payment limits 
(Commission on the Application of Payment Limitations for Agriculture). The Commission also 
concluded that payment limits have a very small impact on total direct payments and CCPs for 
current program crops. 
 Assuming that producers take full advantage of the three-entity rule but do not otherwise 
reorganize their farm businesses in response to payment limits, we estimate that 60 percent or 
more of sugar beet acreage would be farmed by producers subject to payment limits, and at least 
95 percent of sugarcane acreage would be farmed by producers subject to payment limits. We 
estimate that strict payment limits along these lines would reduce expenditures on direct 
payments by about one-half, from $463 million per year to about $224 million per year ($166 
million/year for beets and $58 million/year for cane). CCP and LDP expenditures would be 
reduced by a similar percentage in the scenarios where they occur (those involving high Mexican 
imports). Actual expenditures on direct payments would likely fall somewhere between $224 and 
$463 million per year. 
 One option for facilitating adjustment by producers to the new program would be to 
provide transitional payments along the lines of those offered under the recent tobacco and 
peanut quota buyouts. Transitional payments could be made proportional to current marketing 
allotments, and producers could be given the option of receiving the payments over a period of 
years or in one lump sum. The situation is not completely analogous to tobacco or peanuts 
because quotas for those commodities had an established economic value that marketing 
allotments for sugar do not have. Nevertheless, the allotments could form a basis for such 
transitional payments. 
 
Appendix C. Sensitivity Analysis: How Robust Are The Results? 
In any economic study, a number of assumptions are required to generate the final set of 
numbers. This study was no exception. Assumptions were needed on everything from future 
consumer behavior to the responsiveness of producers to changing prices, from the linkages 
between the farm and retail markets to the future actions of the Mexican government. 
 
To deal with these effects, a common practice is to incorporate a sensitivity analysis on some of 
the key assumptions: vary some of the assumptions, rerun the analysis, and determine the 
differences caused by making different assumptions. Some of these important assumptions have 
already been considered in the body of the report. For example, the Low Import Baseline and the 
High Import Baseline were both included as baselines because of the uncertainty, and also the 
importance, of the import issue to this sector. 
 Two external committees reviewed the work and the report. One was the Farm Bureau 
Sugar Commodity Advisory Committee (SCAC). The other was an external committee made up 
 37
of academics and an industry representative. Both committees raised issues they felt were critical 
assumptions in the study and asked that sensitivity analyses be conducted in these areas.  
 The first, raised by the SCAC, related to the path of consumer demand. Through much of 
the 1990s, domestic caloric sweetener consumption grew year over year. However, with the 
advent of low-carb diets and other nutritional shifts, consumption trends actually reversed. The 
SCAC felt that a scenario looking at continued declines in consumption would be appropriate. 
 The second concern was raised by the panel of industry and academic representatives. 
For this panel, the focus was more on the underlying economic structure of the industry. The 
model used to conduct the analysis incorporated relationships between the price of sugar, the 
prices of HFCS, and domestic consumption. These are clearly a key set of relationships that go a 
long way in determining the final conclusions. Consequently, it was suggested that a less 
responsive set of relationships should be examined. 
 
Declining Consumption Scenario 
Under the baseline, per-capita deliveries—a proxy for consumption—split the difference 
between the patterns demonstrated over the last several years. Consumption was essentially 
assumed to continue to demonstrate a slight decline, falling 2.5 pounds per capita between 2004 
and 2015, the last year of the analysis. 
 For the reduced consumption scenario, per-capita consumption dipped from the 66.9-
pound level observed in 2004 to only 55 pounds in 2015. HFCS consumption was assumed to be 
essentially constant in both. Several justifications could be given for the lower consumption 
scenario, with population changes, health concerns, and greater availability of non-caloric 
sweeteners for the cooking and baking sectors being but a few. The exact levels chosen for the 
decline are somewhat arbitrary but reflect the general sentiments reflected by the SCAC. 
 As the policy parameters around the scenario continue current provisions, the reduction 
in consumption must reverberate back onto domestic production. With import levels 
predetermined by existing agreements (the scenario was run off of the Low Import Baseline), all 
of the adjustment is forced on domestic producers. By the end of the period, in 2015, sugar 
production in the United States has fallen 1.7 million short tons below the levels seen under the 
Low Import Baseline. 
 Taking this one step further, beet area would need to fall every year by 31,000 acres, 
while cane area would drop 21,000 acres for the length of the analysis. But to put this in 
perspective, even under the baseline, i.e., minimal declines in domestic consumption, beet area 
falls by nearly 10,000 acres per year and cane by nearly a similar amount. Regardless, with a 
policy design in place to maintain a price by adjusting production, there will be little opportunity 
for the sector to grow. 
 
Less Responsive Demand Scenario 
The second area for sensitivity analysis related to how demand for sugar adjusts to changes in the 
price of sugar. One of the main areas of change suggested in the underlying study is substitution 
of sugar for HFCS as sugar prices decline. This becomes a major issue when considering the 
“standard” proposal. For every penny that sugar prices decline, the cost to the federal 
government rises by $150-$170 million, so this is not a trivial question. 
 To test this sensitivity, the basic model’s substitution between sugar and HFCS was 
sharply curtailed, to the point in which there was only one-tenth the adjustment as before. The 
results of this analysis are summarized in Table C1. Yellow columns indicate the results under 
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the low substitution assumption. Begin looking at these results by comparing the High Import 
Baseline to the High Import/Low Substitutability Baseline (columns 2 and 2b). Again, the same 
underlying assumptions regarding HFCS shipments to Mexico hold; however, in this case, there 
is only a limited shift by the soft drink industry in the United States back toward sugar from 
HFCS. Consequently, there is less demand for sugar than seen in the high import scenario. 
Following from that is a need for an even stronger PIK program to keep stocks from building, 
boosting the government cost by another $70 million per year. 
 Now change the policy to the “standard” program analyzed earlier (column 4b). With 
limited substitutability into HFCS markets, the price for sugar must fall even more to obtain a 
balance between supply and demand. Under the earlier analysis, the price falls to 16.9¢ from 
18.7¢ in the high import scenario. Under the High Import/Low Substitution Baseline, the price 
declines from 18.7¢ to 16.2¢. This raises the cost of the program from $521 million to $691 
million. However, offsetting some of these additional outlays are the higher costs of the PIK 
under continuation of current policies. This results in a net change in government outlays 
because of the policy alternative of $451 million—actually less than the outcome obtained under 
the low import alternative. 
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Table C.1. Sensitivity Analysis U.S. Sugar and Sweetener Supply, Utilization, and Prices
1 2 2b 3 4 4b  2-1 2b-1  3-1  4-2 4b-2b (2-1)/1*100  (2b-1)/1*100  (3-1)/1*100  (4-2)/2*100
High-Import, High-Import High Imp, Low Low-Import High-Import High Imp, Low % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
High-Import, Low-Import High-Import Low-Subst. Baseline - Subst. Base- U.S. Policy - U.S. Policy - Sub.. U.S. Pol High vs. High Imp. Lo- U.S. Policy U.S. Policy
Low-Import High-Import Low-Substit. U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Low-Import Low-Import Low-Import High-Import - Hi Imp, Low Low-Import Sub. vs.Low- vs. Low-Imporvs. High-Import 
Baseline Baseline Baseline Scenario Scenario Scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Sub. Baseline Baseline Imp. Baseline Baseline Baseline 
(Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Sugar allotment 8,564 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sugar production 8,591 8,287 8,105 9,088 8,630 8,411 -303 -485 497 343 306 -3.5% -5.7% 5.8% 4.1%
Sugar imports 1,847 2,984 2,978 1,767 2,919 2,887 1,137 1,132 -80 -64 -91 61.6% 61.3% -4.3% -2.1%
  (of which, duty-free NAFTA) 218 1,355 1,349 138 1,290 1,258 1,137 1,132 -80 -64 -91 522.5% 520.1% -36.6% -4.7%
Sugar domestic deliveries 10,177 10,906 10,708 10,586 11,273 11,016 728 531 409 367 308 7.2% 5.2% 4.0% 3.4%
Sugar exports 213 216 217 217 220 221 3 3 4 3 5 1.6% 1.6% 1.9% 1.6%
Sugar ending stocks 2,050 2,709 2,751 2,085 2,148 2,173 658 701 35 -560 -578 32.1% 34.2% 1.7% -20.7%
  (of which, CCC stocks) 87 1,066 1,081 0 0 0 979 994 -87 -1,066 -1,081 1124.5% 1142.2% -100.0% -100.0%
Sugar-containing product
  net imports 563 541 540 537 518 510 -22 -23 -26 -23 -30 -3.9% -4.0% -4.6% -4.2%
(Thousand short tons, calendar year 2008-2015 average)
HFCS production 9,183 8,990 9,288 8,932 8,766 9,232 -193 104 -251 -224 -56 -2.1% 1.1% -2.7% -2.5%
HFCS domestic use 8,951 8,167 8,470 8,692 7,939 8,413 -784 -481 -259 -228 -56 -8.8% -5.4% -2.9% -2.8%
HFCS net exports 232 823 818 240 827 819 591 586 8 4 1 254.7% 252.4% 3.3% 0.5%
(Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
N.Y. spot raw sugar 20.60 18.73 18.69 18.42 16.86 16.17 -1.87 -1.90 -2.17 -1.87 -2.52 -9.1% -9.2% -10.5% -10.0%
Refined beet sugar 23.64 21.05 21.00 20.63 18.45 17.50 -2.59 -2.64 -3.02 -2.60 -3.50 -11.0% -11.2% -12.8% -12.3%
Retail refined sugar 44.02 41.09 41.05 40.55 37.99 37.04 -2.93 -2.97 -3.47 -3.10 -4.01 -6.7% -6.8% -7.9% -7.5%
HFCS, 42%, Midwest (cal. yr.) 12.04 11.38 12.40 11.20 10.66 12.22 -0.65 0.36 -0.84 -0.72 -0.18 -5.4% 3.0% -7.0% -6.3%
Table C.2. Sensitivity Analysis U.S. Sugar Beet Production, Prices, and Returns
1 2 2b 3 4 4b  2-1 2b-1  3-1  4-2 4b-2b (2-1)/1*100  (2b-1)/1*100  (3-1)/1*100  (4-2)/2*100
High-Import, High-Import High Imp, Low Low-Import High-Import High Imp, Low % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
High-Import, Low-Import High-Import Low-Subst. Baseline - Subst. Base- U.S. Policy - U.S. Policy - Sub.. U.S. Pol High vs. High Imp. Lo- U.S. Policy U.S. Policy
Low-Import High-Import Low-Substit. U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Low-Import Low-Import Low-Import High-Import - Hi Imp, Low Low-Import Sub. vs.Low- vs. Low-Imporvs. High-Import 
Baseline Baseline Baseline Scenario Scenario Scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Sub. Baseline Baseline Imp. Baseline Baseline Baseline 
(Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
U.S. sugar beet production 28,350 26,970 26,303 29,688 28,362 27,717 -1,380 -2,047 1,338 1,392 1,414 -4.9% -7.2% 4.7% 5.2%
  California 1,713 1,625 1,586 1,807 1,701 1,654 -88 -127 94 76 68 -5.1% -7.4% 5.5% 4.7%
  Colorado 689 646 625 702 659 631 -43 -64 13 13 6 -6.3% -9.3% 1.9% 2.1%
  Idaho 5,224 4,953 4,833 5,461 5,138 4,998 -271 -392 237 185 165 -5.2% -7.5% 4.5% 3.7%
  Michigan 3,134 2,965 2,881 3,086 2,918 2,803 -169 -253 -47 -47 -77 -5.4% -8.1% -1.5% -1.6%
  Minnesota 9,209 8,802 8,597 9,739 9,427 9,290 -406 -611 531 624 692 -4.4% -6.6% 5.8% 7.1%
  Montana 1,202 1,141 1,111 1,271 1,216 1,192 -62 -92 69 75 81 -5.1% -7.6% 5.7% 6.6%
  Nebraska 781 736 716 809 738 696 -44 -65 29 2 -20 -5.7% -8.3% 3.7% 0.3%
  North Dakota 5,202 4,970 4,854 5,633 5,444 5,360 -232 -348 431 474 505 -4.5% -6.7% 8.3% 9.5%
  Ohio 37 35 34 36 34 33 -2 -3 -1 -1 -1 -5.4% -8.1% -1.5% -1.6%
  Oregon 342 326 319 332 316 309 -16 -23 -10 -11 -10 -4.6% -6.7% -3.0% -3.2%
  Washington 146 139 136 141 134 131 -7 -10 -4 -5 -4 -4.7% -6.9% -3.0% -3.3%
  Wyoming 672 632 612 669 637 621 -40 -60 -2 5 9 -6.0% -9.0% -0.4% 0.8%
(Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Refined beet sugar price 23.64 21.05 21.00 20.63 18.45 17.50 -2.59 -2.64 -3.02 -2.60 -3.50 -11.0% -11.2% -12.8% -12.3%
(Dollars per ton, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Sugar beet price 40.38 37.08 37.02 36.55 33.79 32.58 -3.29 -3.35 -3.82 -3.29 -4.44 -8.2% -8.3% -9.5% -8.9%
(Dollars per acre, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Gross market returns 920.08 844.78 843.46 833.59 769.97 741.99 -75.31 -76.63 -86.49 -74.81 -101.47 -8.2% -8.3% -9.4% -8.9%
 40
Table c.3. Sensitivity Analysis U.S. Sugarcane Production, Prices, and Returns
1 2 3 4 5 6  2-1  3-1  4-1  5-2  6-3 (2-1)/1*100  (3-1)/1*100  (4-1)/1*100  (5-2)/2*100  (6-3)/3*100
High-Import, High-Import High Imp, Low Low-Import High-Import High Imp, Low % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
High-Import, Low-Import High-Import Low-Subst. Baseline - Subst. Base- U.S. Policy - U.S. Policy - Sub.. U.S. Pol High vs. High Imp. Lo- U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy
Low-Import High-Import Low-Substit. U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Low-Import Low-Import Low-Import High-Import - Hi Imp, Low Low-Import Sub. vs.Low- vs. Low-Imporvs. High-Import vs. High-Imp.
Baseline Baseline Baseline Scenario Scenario Scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Sub. Baseline Baseline Imp. Baseline Baseline Baseline Lo-Sub. Base 
(Thousand short tons, raw basis, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
U.S. sugarcane production 31,279 30,673 30,105 33,471 31,566 30,674 -606 -1,174 2,192 893 569 -1.9% -3.8% 7.0% 2.9% 1.9%
  Florida 15,095 14,977 14,683 16,107 15,069 14,577 -118 -412 1,012 92 -106 -0.8% -2.7% 6.7% 0.6% -0.7%
  Hawaii 1,779 1,085 1,072 973 361 108 -693 -706 -806 -724 -965 -39.0% -39.7% -45.3% -66.7% -89.9%
  Louisiana 12,893 13,093 12,858 14,660 14,454 14,328 200 -34 1,767 1,362 1,470 1.6% -0.3% 13.7% 10.4% 11.4%
  Texas 1,512 1,518 1,491 1,731 1,682 1,660 6 -21 219 164 169 0.4% -1.4% 14.5% 10.8% 11.4%
(Cents per pound, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
N.Y. raw sugar price 20.60 18.73 18.69 18.42 16.86 16.17 -1.87 -1.90 -2.17 -1.87 -2.52 -9.1% -9.2% -10.5% -10.0% -13.5%
(Dollars per ton, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Sugarcane price 27.81 25.33 25.29 24.93 22.86 32.58 -2.47 -2.52 -2.87 -2.47 7.29 -8.9% -9.1% -10.3% -9.8% 28.8%
(Dollars per acre, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Gross market returns 1014.32 910.08 908.39 890.34 804.89 767.67 -104.25 -105.93 -123.98 -105.19 -140.72 -10.3% -10.4% -12.2% -11.6% -15.5%
Variable expenses 748.45 748.45 748.45 748.45 748.45 748.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Net market return 265.87 161.63 159.94 141.89 56.44 19.22 -104.25 -105.93 -123.98 -105.19 -140.72 -39.2% -39.8% -46.6% -65.1% -88.0%
Loan deficiency payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Counter-cyclical payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.73 61.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.73 61.86 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Direct payment 0.00 0.00 0.00 217.57 217.57 217.57 0.00 0.00 217.57 217.57 217.57 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table c.4. Sensitivity Analysis U.S. Corn Use and Prices
1 2 2b 3 4 4b  2-1 2b-1  3-1  4-2 4b-2b (2-1)/1*100  (2b-1)/1*100  (3-1)/1*100  (4-2)/2*100  (4b-2b)/3*100
High-Import, High-Import High Imp, Low Low-Import High-Import High Imp, Low % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
High-Import, Low-Import High-Import Low-Subst. Baseline - Subst. Base- U.S. Policy - U.S. Policy - Sub.. U.S. Pol High vs. High Imp. Lo- U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy
Low-Import High-Import Low-Substit. U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Low-Import Low-Import Low-Import High-Import - Hi Imp, Low Low-Import Sub. vs.Low- vs. Low-Imporvs. High-Import vs. High-Imp.
Baseline Baseline Baseline Scenario Scenario Scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Sub. Baseline Baseline Imp. Baseline Baseline Baseline Lo-Sub. Base 
(Million bushels, crop year 2007/08-2014/15 average)
Corn for HFCS production 539 528 546 525 515 542 -11 6 -15 -13 -3 -2.1% 1.1% -2.7% -2.5% -0.6%
(Dollars per bushel, crop year 2007/08-2014/15 average)
U.S. corn farm price 2.329 2.326 2.329 2.325 2.323 2.328 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1% -0.1%
Table c.5. Sensitivity Analysis U.S. Government Program Costs
1 2 2b 3 4 4b  2-1 2b-1  3-1  4-2 4b-2b (2-1)/1*100  (2b-1)/1*100  (3-1)/1*100  (4-2)/2*100  (4b-2b)/3*100
High-Import, High-Import High Imp, Low Low-Import High-Import High Imp, Low % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change, % Change,
High-Import, Low-Import High-Import Low-Subst. Baseline - Subst. Base- U.S. Policy - U.S. Policy - Sub.. U.S. Pol High vs. High Imp. Lo- U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy
Low-Import High-Import Low-Substit. U.S. Policy U.S. Policy U.S. Policy Low-Import Low-Import Low-Import High-Import - Hi Imp, Low Low-Import Sub. vs.Low- vs. Low-Imporvs. High-Import vs. High-Imp.
Baseline Baseline Baseline Scenario Scenario Scenario Baseline Baseline Baseline Baseline Sub. Baseline Baseline Imp. Baseline Baseline Baseline Lo-Sub. Base 
(Million dollars, fiscal year 2008-2015 average)
Sugar direct payments 0 0 0 463 463 463 0 0 463 463 463 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sugar counter-cyclical payments 0 0 0 0 36 132 0 0 0 36 132 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sugar loan deficiency payments 0 0 0 0 23 96 0 0 0 23 96 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
  Sub-total 0 0 0 463 521 691 0 0 463 521 691 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Other sugar costs (loans, etc.) 8 175 245 -1 -1 -1 167 237 -9 -176 -246 2192.1% 3110.3% -117.7% -100.7% -100.5%
Sugar total costs 8 175 245 462 520 690 167 237 454 345 445 2192.1% 3110.3% 5951.4% 197.3% 181.6%
Corn counter-cyclical payments 221 233 218 238 250 225 12 -3 16 16 6 5.5% -1.4% 7.4% 7.0% 2.9%
 
 
